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UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR

Evidence and Analysis

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Foreword

The World Bank's role in addressing the ravages caused by violent conflict is historical—its first loans were made to support the reconstruction of Western European countries devastated by the Second World War. Over the following five decades, as most of the world's conflicts amounted to proxy wars between the superpowers or postcolonial independence struggles, the Bank limited its involvement in conflict-affected countries to providing financial capital and rebuilding infrastructure after conflicts had ended. However, in a post-Cold War era marked by an increase in the number and severity of civil conflicts, the Bank found it had to adapt to different and more complex challenges. Two events in the mid-1990s marked a turning point in the Bank's approach to conflict. The first occurred in 1994, when the Bank was asked to administer the multidonor Holst Fund for the West Bank and Gaza; the second occurred in 1995, when the Bank was asked to take the lead with the European Commission in planning and coordinating international support for postconflict recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnia-Herzegovina program, in particular, broke the mold and formed the basis for a new postconflict framework that was to become a Bank operational policy within a few years.

Realizing that it faced a far more difficult postconflict environment and growing expectations on the part of the international community, in 1997 the Bank created a small locus of expertise in postconflict reconstruction, the Post-Conflict Unit, and defined the parameters for Bank engagement in countries affected by conflict, firmly focused on the Bank's reconstruction role after the conflict ended. To complement this expertise, in August 1997 the Bank created the Post-Conflict Fund, a grant facility to support countries in transition from conflict to sustainable development and encourage innovation and external partnerships in dealing with conflict-affected countries.

Because poverty has proven to be both a cause and a consequence of conflict, toward the late 1990s the Bank sought to redefine its role more broadly in the context of a more comprehensive approach to development, in line with evolving international initiatives to explore the potential role of development assistance and conflict prevention. The Bank shifted its focus from an approach based on rebuilding infra-

Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia

2

MICHAEL L. ROSS

Indonesia is large, poor, and resource abundant, and has had a history of political violence. It should be no surprise that it suffered from a civil war in 1989–91 and then again at the start of 1999. Both of these conflicts took place in the westernmost province of Aceh. How well does the Collier-Hoeffler (CH) model explain the Aceh conflicts?

To answer this question this study focuses on the rise of Aceh's rebel organization, known as GAM (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, Aceh Freedom Movement).¹ GAM has had three incarnations: the first in 1976–79, when it was small and ill-equipped, and was easily suppressed by the military; the second in 1989–91, when it was larger, better trained, and better equipped, and was only put down through harsh security measures; and the third beginning in 1999, when it became larger and better funded than ever before, challenging the Indonesian government's control of the province (see table 2.1). This chapter explains why GAM arose at each of these times, and why, between 1976 and 2002, it steadily grew larger and more powerful.

Although Indonesia has frequently suffered from violent conflict, the civil wars in Aceh have been the country's only civil wars since 1960, if the standard definition of civil wars is applied.² A government-sponsored slaughter in 1965–66 killed between 100,000 and 1 million people, but this was a one-sided massacre in which government forces suffered few casualties, and the victims were civilians, not a rebel army. The Indonesian government invaded the Dutch colony of Netherlands New Guinea in 1962, and the Portuguese colony of East Timor in 1975, causing many thousands of deaths in each territory. Since these were invasions of foreign territory, however, they cannot be classified as "internal" conflicts.³ In 1999–2000, there were bloody clashes between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia's Molucca Islands; these too do not qualify as civil wars, since the parties fought each other, not the government. Only the conflicts between the Indonesian government and GAM—which resulted in over 1,000 deaths in 1990, 1991, 2000, 2001, 2002, and possibly several other years—qualify as civil wars.

This chapter makes several arguments. The first is that the civil war in Aceh can be largely explained by the central insights of the CH model, particularly its stress on

Table 2.1 The Three Incarnations of GAM

Organization	Years	Active members	Casualties
GAM I	1976–79	25–200	>100
GAM II	1989–91	200–750	1990–92: 2,000–10,000
GAM III	1999–	15–27,000	1999: 393 2000: 1,041 2001: 1,700 2002: 1,230

the importance of rebel financing, poverty, and the effects of past conflict. The second argument is that to provide a more complete explanation of Indonesia's civil wars, it is useful to include four additional factors: charismatic leadership, which appeared in the form of GAM's founder, Hasan di Tiro; popular grievances, which influenced the willingness of the Acehnese to support GAM; demonstration effects, which came from the referendum for independence in another Indonesian province, East Timor; and government credibility, which dropped sharply between 1987 and 1999 and made it virtually impossible for the Indonesian government to placate the Acehnese people with an offer of local autonomy.

The third argument is that even though Aceh's abundance of primary commodities had an important influence on the civil war (as Collier and Hoeffler predict), this effect occurred through different causal mechanisms than the one that they suggest. Collier and Hoeffler suggest that commodities increase the risk of civil war because they offer rebels an easy source of start-up funding. Even though Aceh is rich in natural resources, it provided the rebels with no start-up funding; yet it did contribute to the onset of the war in three other ways: by creating grievances over the distribution of resource revenues; by introducing a larger and more aggressive military presence into the province; and possibly by making the government's offer of regional autonomy less credible.⁴

This study is organized into three sections and a brief conclusion. The first section examines the rise and fall of GAM between 1976 and 1979; the second, GAM's rise and fall between 1989 and 1991; and the third, GAM's return and growth between 1999 and 2003. Each of these sections looks at the factors that influenced the risk of civil war in Indonesia as a whole, and in Aceh as a region, on the eve of GAM's incarnation and describes GAM's organization, funding, strategies, and activities, and the government's response. The conclusion summarizes the analysis and examines in greater detail the role of Aceh's natural resource wealth.

Conflict Risk in Indonesia and Aceh, 1976

Indonesia

In 1976, Indonesia faced a relatively high risk of civil war because of a combination of ethnic, geographical, economic, political, and historical factors. Indonesia's ethnic

composition had, and still has, both positive and negative implications for the country's risk of civil war. It is among the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, home to perhaps 300 distinct language groups. In at least some instances, this extraordinary level of diversity has probably reduced the risk of civil war by making it more difficult for aggrieved groups to form large alliances against the state. In West Papua, for example, members of the long-standing pro-separatist organization *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* have had difficulty forming a united front, because of animosity among the province's tribes.

Indonesia's ethnic composition poses a civil war risk, however, because of the dominance of the largest "ethnic" group, the Javanese. In 1976, the ethnic Javanese constituted 45 percent of the population; the Sundanese, who are often grouped with the Javanese because they, like the Javanese, are concentrated on the island of Java, constituted another 15 percent of the population. Whether they are treated as 45 percent or 60 percent of the population, the size of this group has often contributed to antagonism between Indonesians who are indigenous to Java, and those from other islands. Non-Javanese people see Indonesia's government and military as Javanese-controlled.

Viewed along religious lines, Indonesia suffers from a second type of ethnic dominance: close to 90 percent of the population is Muslim. In Indonesia's predominantly non-Muslim areas—East Timor, Nusa Tenggara, and West Papua—this has at times produced a profound fear of Muslim supremacy. Although Indonesia is not an Islamic state, and Indonesia's governments have generally supported the religious rights of minorities, the rebellions in East Timor and West Papua have both been partly motivated by a fear of Muslim dominance.

Indonesia's economic status in the mid-1970s also produced a significant conflict risk. Indonesia is a low-income country, and per capita in 1976 was just \$395 (in constant 1995 dollars) (World Bank 2001). Moreover, in 1976 Indonesia was highly dependent on the export of natural resources, with a resource export-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio of 19.4 percent. This was due to a boom in both oil and timber exports in the early 1970s.⁵

At the same time, there were several economic factors that mitigated this risk. Economic growth was steady and high, averaging 7.8 percent from 1970 to 1979 and never falling below 6 percent. Income inequality has been, and remains, relatively low: its Gini coefficient was 34.6, which is relatively favorable for a low-income country. A 1987 survey found that the poorest 20 percent of households had 8.8 percent of national income. This is a greater share than in all but one low-income state and two lower-middle-income states for which data were available (World Bank 1992).

By 1976, Indonesia had suffered from a history of violent conflict, although that conflict is usually not coded by scholars as a "civil war." In 1965–66, between 100,000 and 1 million Indonesians were killed by the military and citizen groups supported by the military, as part of an effort to eradicate the influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The slaughter was touched off by a coup and countercoup that eventually toppled President Sukarno, and replaced him with Major General

Suharto. Because these killings took the form of a massacre of mostly unarmed civilians, scholars generally do not treat this event as a civil war. Nevertheless, if a recent prior conflict raises the danger of a future conflict by producing unresolved grievances, the 1965–66 slaughter may have heightened the risk of subsequent conflict.

Finally, the absence of a large diaspora may have reduced Indonesia's civil war risk. Although most adjacent countries provide no data on Indonesian migrants, Indonesians commonly migrate to other islands within the archipelago, not to other countries. The largest populations of overseas Indonesians are almost certainly found in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.

Aceh

While Indonesia's 1976 conflict risk was high, it was not equally high across the country's 26 provinces and 13,000 islands. Within Indonesia, the conflict risk may have been atypically high in the westernmost province of Aceh.

Even though Indonesia as a whole is ethnically diverse, Aceh is relatively homogeneous. Virtually all of Aceh's 2.26 million people in 1976 were Muslim; and 21 percent belonged to ethnic minority groups, including the Gayonese (10 percent), the Tamiang Malays (9 percent), and the Alas (2 percent). However, these groups posed no obstacles to the formation of a separatist movement (Central Bureau of Statistics 1971; King and Rasjid, 1988). Indeed, one report suggested that members of the largest minority group, the Gayonese, had joined the Acehese separatists in attacking Javanese settlers (*Tempo* 2001b).⁶

Aceh's geography is also a risk factor: 53 percent of the land is "steep" (having more than 25 percent slope) and 36 percent is "very steep" (more than 45 percent slope) (Dawood and Sjafrizal 1989). Mountainous terrain can help provide a safe haven for a guerrilla army that is outnumbered by government forces.

In general, Aceh's economy did not pose any special risk.⁷ According to a national survey in 1971 (which predates the development of major energy resources on Aceh), Aceh's per capita GDP was 97 percent of the national average. Between 1971 and 1975, Aceh's real annual growth rate averaged 5.2 percent; this was below the national average but still robust (Hill and Weidemann 1989).

Although there is no reliable information on inequality in Aceh in the mid-1970s, there is substantial evidence that poverty rates were low, due in part to a large surplus of rice, the staple food crop. In 1980, just 1.8 percent of the rural population and 1.7 percent of the urban population were below the poverty line; these were among the lowest rates in the country. Health standards were also relatively high and improved substantially during the 1970s: in 1969, infant mortality rates were 131 per 1,000, slightly below the national rate of 141 per 1,000. By 1977, Aceh's rates had dropped to 91 per 1,000, while national rates fell to 108 per 1,000. Life expectancy was also better than the national average and improved sharply between 1969 and 1977 (Hill and Weidemann 1989).

Even before the rise of GAM, Aceh had a long history of violent conflict. In the 19th century, the independent sultanate of Aceh offered the fiercest resistance to

Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia, and was only subjugated after 30 years of brutal warfare (1873–1903). Although the Acehese people broadly supported the creation of the Indonesian Republic in the late 1940s, Aceh was the site of a 1953–62 rebellion led by Teungku Daud Beureueh. Importantly, the rebellion did *not* call for Acehese independence, but rather, greater local autonomy and a stronger role for Islam in the national government.⁸ After several years of negotiations, the rebellion ended when the government offered Aceh status as a "special region" (*Daerah Istimewa*) with autonomy over religious, cultural, and educational affairs. But in 1968, shortly after Suharto came to power, the Acehese government's special autonomy was effectively revoked.

Aceh's history as an independent sultanate, and the revocation of special autonomy, contributed to a sense of political grievance toward Jakarta, and was reflected in the national elections of 1971 and 1977. The Suharto regime used myriad forms of coercion to produce a large majority at the national level for its own party (known as *Golkar*); but in Aceh, a rival, Muslim-oriented party (the Development Unity Party, or PPP) enjoyed unique popularity. In 1971, Golkar won 49.7 of Aceh's votes, versus 48.9 percent for the group of parties that later became the PPP. In 1977 Golkar won just 41.0 percent of the vote, while the PPP won 57.5 percent; Aceh was one of just two provinces that did not give Golkar at least a plurality (King and Rasjid 1988).

Finally, there was a small but notable Acehese diaspora in 1976. Aceh lies along the Malacca Straits, which has long been a migration route to mainland Southeast Asia. Although no figures are available from adjacent countries for the 1970s, in 1991 an estimated 10,000 Acehese were living in Malaysia (Vatikiotis 1991).

The Rise and Fall of GAM I

In the mid-1970s, these factors contributed to the foundation of GAM, a separatist rebel movement. During its 1976–79 incarnation, GAM was small and underfinanced and was easily suppressed by the government. Still, the brief 1976–79 incarnation of GAM would contribute to the resurgence of GAM in 1989–91, which in turn led to GAM's return in 1999.

It is hard to imagine the foundation of GAM without the efforts of Hasan Muhammad di Tiro. di Tiro came from a prominent Acehese family in the Acehese district of Pidie; he was the grandson of Teungku Chik di Tiro, a renowned hero of Aceh's war against Dutch colonial rule. In the early 1950s, di Tiro lived in New York City and worked at the Indonesian Mission to the United Nations. In 1953, he quit to support the Daud Beureueh rebellion.

In early 1976, di Tiro secretly returned to Indonesia to build a new guerrilla movement dedicated to Acehese independence. He recruited a cadre of young intellectuals, tried but failed to gain Daud Beureueh's endorsement, and issued a "Declaration of Independence of Aceh-Sumatra."⁹ The declaration offers a glimpse of di Tiro's rationales: It presents a romantic account of Aceh's history as an independent state; it denounces the "illegal transfer of sovereignty over our fatherland by

the old, Dutch, colonialists to the new, Javanese colonialists"; it claims that Aceh has been impoverished by Javanese rule, stating that "the life-expectancy of our people is 34 years and is decreasing"; and it blames these economic hardships on the central government's appropriation of revenue from Aceh's new natural gas facility: "Aceh, Sumatra, has been producing a revenue of over 15 billion US dollars yearly for the Javanese neo-colonialists, which they used totally for the benefit of Java and the Javanese."

Some of the declaration's assertions had little empirical basis. Life expectancy in Aceh rose from 48.5 years in 1969 to 55.5 years in 1977; by contrast, life expectancy in Indonesia as a whole was 46.5 years in 1969 and 52.5 years in 1977 (Hill and Weidemann 1989). Aceh was also not yet producing the \$15 billion for "the Javanese" as the declaration claimed, but the allusion to Aceh's mineral wealth foreshadowed GAM's preoccupation with the province's natural resources.

The declaration is notable for what it does not say: It makes no mention of Islam, an issue that was central to the Daud Beureueh rebellion and a major source of dissatisfaction with Jakarta. Acehese tend to be more devout than their fellow Indonesians, and at the polls favored the Islamic PPP over the secular Golkar. The declaration also fails to mention the Suharto government's authoritarian rule and does not call for a federal Indonesia with greater autonomy for Aceh, a position previously advocated by di Tiro (di Tiro [1958] 1999).

di Tiro's decision to back independence, not federalism, was influenced by his efforts to find a message that appealed to both the Acehese people, and to foreign governments that could fund the movement. After quitting his United Nations post in 1953, di Tiro had tried to raise funds and purchase arms for the Daud Beureueh rebellion. Therefore, he must have been acutely aware of the need to appeal to foreign funders.

di Tiro believed that foreign governments would not support a movement that called for Aceh's autonomy within an Indonesian federation, since this would be regarded as a purely domestic affair. If the movement called for Acehese independence, he reasoned, foreign governments would be more likely to lend their support. He may have also chosen independence as a goal for a second reason: the Daud Beureueh rebellion—which the young di Tiro passionately supported—ended in 1962 when the central government agreed to grant Aceh a special level of autonomy within the Indonesian state. Jakarta never fulfilled its promise, and Aceh remained a "special aera" in name only. Any future pledges of autonomy would have little credibility in di Tiro's mind, and were pointless to pursue.

He apparently decided not to make appeals based on Islam, for fear it would alienate potential foreign backers. This was a critical decision, because it apparently cost di Tiro the support of Daud Beureueh himself, along with his energetic and experienced supporters (Sjamsuddin 1984).¹⁰ di Tiro solicited aid from the CIA, but without success.

Instead of raising the issues of Islam or democracy, di Tiro focused on Aceh's new status as an exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Mobil Oil had discovered immense deposits of gas in Aceh in 1971, near the town of Lhokseumawe; there was

enough to generate \$2–\$3 billion annually in export revenues over a 20- to 30-year period.¹¹ To exploit these reserves, Mobil entered into a joint venture with Pertamina, the Indonesian oil parastatal, and Jilco, a Japanese consortium. Production began in 1977, reaching maximum capacity in 1988 (Dawood and Sjafrizal 1989).

There were considerable economic benefits for Aceh from the LNG boom. During construction, the new facility employed 8,000–12,000 people; during the peak years of production, it employed between 5,000 and 6,000. Since local infrastructure was poor, Mobil also built new roads, schools, medical facilities, and 4,000–5,000 new houses. Along with the processing facility came several downstream industries, including a fertilizer plant and a chemicals plant (Dawood and Sjafrizal 1989).

There can be little doubt that the new LNG complex was welcomed in Aceh. The government initially planned to extract the gas and ship it to North Sumatra, an adjacent province with a more quiescent reputation, for processing. After strong Acehese protests, they agreed to build the industrial complex in Aceh (Sjamsuddin 1984).

Still, the LNG complex also produced resentments. Locals believed that the project employed too few Acehese, and that local firms were unfairly excluded from consideration. Mobil officials suggested that they employed as many Acehese as they could, but were often forced to rely on Indonesians from other parts of the country who had more skills and experience.¹² Hasan di Tiro was personally familiar with these resentments. In 1974, he had lost to Bechtel, a U.S. firm, in a bidding competition to build one of the pipelines (Robinson 1998). GAM was not opposed to the LNG facility itself, but it did object to the payment of royalties to the central government.¹³

In its 1976–79 incarnation, GAM was small and engaged in few military activities. It never controlled any territory, and it was forced to move on as soon as its presence was discovered by the Indonesian army. Estimates of its active membership range from two dozen to 200. Some of its fighters were apparently forced to join the movement. Much of GAM's activity consisted of distributing pamphlets and raising an Acehese flag. They possessed only a "few old guns and remnants from World War II," and extorted money from townspeople to support their efforts. At times, di Tiro and his men went for days without food (Hiorth 1986; Sjamsuddin 1984).

Several of their most significant actions were directed against the LNG facility. Around 1977, GAM guerrillas stole the facility's payroll. In December 1977, GAM shot two American workers at the plant, killing one. The shootings occurred when GAM rebels tried to arrange a secret meeting with an Acehese manager for the LNG plant, to "discuss ways and means to protect the LNG plant . . . from possible damage from the raging guerrilla warfare around it" (di Tiro 1984). di Tiro's description implies that GAM may have been trying to extort protection money from the facility.

The government responded to GAM's emergence with a combination of military force and economic programs. Suspects were arrested and tortured; women and children were held as hostages by the government when their husbands evaded arrest; and between August 1977 and August 1980, 30 men in Aceh were shot dead in public

without due process. At the same time, the government initiated new road projects, installed new television relay stations in remote rural areas, and persuaded civic leaders, including some who had been involved in the Daud Beureueh rebellion to oppose GAM. Daud Beureueh himself was flown to Jakarta to make sure he would not throw his support behind di Tiro. In 1979, di Tiro was forced to leave the country, and most of his followers either fled with him or were killed by the military. The military's operations against GAM continued until 1982, and trials of suspected GAM supporters continued until 1984 (Kell 1995; Sjamsuddin 1984).

By the early 1980s, GAM had effectively disappeared. Its activities lasted barely two years and attracted only a handful of backers. It was chronically short of funds and arms and was easily extinguished by government forces. Although Aceh was the site of an earlier rebellion, GAM was unable to attract the support of key backers of the previous movement. The LNG facility was just starting production, and had not yet generated the resentments and disappointments that would later provide GAM with widespread sympathy. It was not a time well suited to rebellion.

Conflict Risk in Aceh, 1989

Between 1979 and 1989, Aceh enjoyed swift economic growth, yet the province's risk of conflict escalated as a boom in LNG production created new grievances. The late 1970s and the 1980s were a period of exceptional economic performance in Aceh, characterized by strong growth across all sectors. Aceh's agricultural GDP grew, in real terms, at an average annual rate of 7.6 percent from 1975 to 1984, and at just under 5 percent from 1984 to 1989. Aceh's manufacturing sector did even better, growing at an average rate of 13.7 percent between 1975 and 1984, and at almost 8 percent annually from 1984 to 1989. But the economy's most striking feature was the LNG boom. In 1976, oil and gas accounted for less than 17 percent of the province's GDP; by 1989, it accounted for 69.5 percent. Thanks to these trends, Aceh's per capita GDP (excluding the value of oil and gas) kept pace with Indonesia's quickly rising incomes.¹⁴

This rapid growth, ironically, may have caused social disruptions that eventually contributed to the 1989 return of GAM. Between 1974 and 1987, the district of North Aceh, which included P. T. Arun, Mobil's natural gas facility, rose in population from 490,000 to 755,000; social amenities and infrastructure for workers and job seekers were severely overstretched. Some 50,000 migrants from other parts of Indonesia had also come to Aceh, largely attracted by the oil and gas boom (Hiorth 1986). Rapid urbanization, the incursion of the non-Acehnese, land seizures, pollution, and competition for jobs in the industrial sector all contributed to tensions that facilitated GAM's 1989 re-emergence (Kell 1995).

There were also several political developments that appeared to *increase* popular support for the central government, at least through 1987; however, from 1987 to 1989, this trend may have reversed. In 1984, top officials in the ruling Golkar party began a strategy to increase the party's popularity in Aceh by appointing a popular figure as governor, launching new development projects, and obtaining the endorse-

ment of religious leaders (including Daud Beureueh himself) who had formerly supported the opposition PPP. These efforts led to a jump in Golkar's share of the popular vote, from 37 percent in 1982 to 51.8 percent in 1987. But the boost was temporary. Shortly after the election, Aceh's development budget dropped by 36 percent, and many campaign promises went unfulfilled (King and Rasjid 1988; Liddle 1988).

The Rise and Fall of GAM II

GAM's second coming in 1989 was aided by three factors: support from a foreign government, assistance from local Indonesian security officers, and grievances among the population. Even though GAM was larger and better equipped in 1989 than it had been a decade earlier, it still failed to win widespread support, perhaps because of the region's strong economic performance.

After slipping out of Indonesia in 1979, Hasan di Tiro and some of his top advisors moved to Sweden, where they set up an Acehese government-in-exile. Around 1986, GAM made contact with the Libyan government. In 1986 or 1987, GAM began to receive Libyan support, as part of dictator Muammar Qaddafi's efforts to promote insurgencies worldwide (Kell 1995). Between 250 and 2,000 GAM recruits, drawn primarily from the Acehese population in Malaysia, received military and ideological training in Libya in the late 1980s.¹⁵ In 1989, between 150 and 800 Libya-trained fighters slipped into Aceh from Malaysia and Singapore (Vatikiotis 1991).

There is also evidence that GAM received a boost from defecting government troops. Amnesty International (1993) notes that in early 1989 at least 47 military officers based in Aceh were dismissed, possibly because of an antinarcotics campaign. Around the same time, "dozens" of ex-military and police officers joined GAM and began to attack military installations and personnel. These defections may help explain both the timing of GAM's re-emergence and its surprising strength (Vatikiotis 1990).

Grievances against the corruption, gambling, and prostitution associated with the transmigrants who were drawn to Aceh by the LNG boom were another factor. In 1988-89, these grievances produced a series of local protests.

In May 1988, for example, villagers of Idi Cut, Aceh Timur, burned down the local police station following reports that a police officer had sexually assaulted a local woman. In August, a hotel in Lhokseumawe, Aceh Utara, was bombed following repeated complaints by the local community that it was being used as a prostitution centre. In March 1989, an estimated 8,000 people rioted in the same town destroying a military-owned building in which a circus, considered offensive by local Islamic leaders, was due to perform. (AI 1993, 8)

GAM was far more aggressive in 1989 than it had been in 1977, both as a result of its larger size and better training. From early 1989 to early 1990, it attacked only

Indonesian police and army units, killing about two dozen officers.¹⁶ In mid-1990, it began targeting civil authorities, commercial property, suspected government informers, and non-Acehnese settlers in the Lhokseumawe area (AI 1993).

GAM's activities were more widespread geographically than they had been a decade earlier, but they were still concentrated along Aceh's northeastern coast, in the districts of Pidie, North Aceh, and East Aceh. Although GAM controlled no territory, it had a rudimentary command structure in these districts, and could mobilize guerrillas for hit-and-run attacks and ambushes (Vatikiotis 1991). North Aceh was also the home of the LNG complex, and both North Aceh and East Aceh had been sites of the 1988–89 protests. Many observers connected the rebellion to grievances caused by the LNG boom, including disputes over the distribution of high-paying jobs and revenues, official corruption, and the un-Islamic behavior of non-Acehnese migrants (Kell 1995; Robinson 1998; Vatikiotis 1990, 1991).

Estimates of GAM's strength in 1989–91 range from 200 to 750 active members. Although Libya had provided training, it did not offer GAM any additional funds or weaponry. Some money was apparently raised among the Acehnese living in Malaysia. GAM also stole (or, perhaps, purchased) weapons from Indonesian security forces, obtaining some 200 automatic rifles and light machine guns by June 1990. Still, guns were scarce, and guerrillas were reportedly forced to share their arms (Kell 1995).

Until mid-1990, the government responded to the attacks on its forces in a relatively low-key manner. But in June 1990, President Suharto ordered 6,000 additional troops to Aceh, including special counterinsurgency units. From this point forward, Aceh was regarded as a "DOM" (*Daerah Operasi Militer*, "area of military operations"), a designation that has no fixed definition or legal status but implies that the military can conduct its operations with impunity.¹⁷

The government's response was successful in the short term. By the end of 1991, many of GAM's field commanders had been captured or killed. But the government's brutality produced a deep-seated antipathy toward Jakarta and ultimately contributed to GAM's third incarnation in 1999.

Independent estimates of the death toll during the 1990–92 period range from just under 2,000 to 10,000. The vast majority of deaths were caused by the government (AI 1993; ICG 2001a). Although human rights violations continued after 1993, only a handful of additional deaths were recorded.

Conflict Risk in Aceh, 1999

By 1999, Aceh's conflict risk had risen sharply, due to five developments: an economic crisis, a transition from authoritarian rule to partial democracy, the demonstration effect from a successful referendum for independence in the province of East Timor, the proximity of the 1989–91 carnage, and a decline in the credibility of the central government.

From 1989 to 1996, the economy in Aceh, as in Indonesia as a whole, continued its rapid growth. But in mid-1997, a currency crisis in Thailand triggered a run on

the Indonesian rupiah, leading to a banking crisis, capital flight, and a sudden economic collapse. The economy contracted by 17.8 percent in 1998 and grew just 0.4 percent in 1999. The crisis was less severe in Aceh than it was in the rest of the country. Nevertheless, Aceh's non-oil and gas GDP declined by 5.9 percent in 1998 and 2.9 percent in 1999. This produced a jump in unemployment and underemployment: In 1998 alone, the size of the official labor force dropped 37.3 percent. Aceh remained overwhelmingly dependent on natural resources. In 1998, oil and gas accounted for 65 percent of Aceh's GDP and 92.7 percent of its exports, although it employed only one-third of 1 percent of the province's labor force (BPS Aceh 1999, 2000).

In May 1998, President Suharto was forced to resign after 32 years in power; he was replaced by Indonesia's vice president, B. J. Habibie. After parliamentary elections, Habibie was succeeded in October 1999 by Abdurrahman Wahid, who headed a new coalition government. The move from authoritarian rule to partial democracy appeared to raise the likelihood of conflict. Many cross-national studies suggest that partial democracies face an unusually high risk of civil war, since aggrieved constituencies may be able to organize, but their grievances cannot be adequately addressed through the electoral system (DeNardo 1985; Hegre et al. 2001). This would prove to be true in Aceh: People became free to express their grievances toward Jakarta, but the electoral system was too weak to facilitate a peaceful solution.¹⁸

Suharto's fall led to a pair of developments that further raised the conflict risk in Aceh: the independence referendum in East Timor and the loss of government credibility. In January 1999, President Habibie announced that East Timor would be allowed to secede from the Indonesian Republic, if its citizens voted to do so in a province-wide referendum. Within weeks, student groups in Aceh had formed organizations calling for a similar referendum. East Timor's referendum was held in September 1999, and produced an overwhelming vote for independence. The following month there were massive marches across Aceh in support of a similar referendum. In November 1999, hundreds of thousands of people—and according to some estimates, as many as 1 million people—gathered in the Acehnese capital, Banda Aceh, to hold a rally in support of the referendum. According to polls taken by a leading pro-referendum nongovernmental organization and the virtually unanimous perception of outside observers, a freely held referendum would have produced a strong vote for independence.

Political leaders in Jakarta were keenly aware of growing support for independence in Aceh and took a series of measures to defuse it. In late July 1998, a fact-finding team from the national parliament admitted that serious human rights violations had occurred in Aceh between 1990 and 1998. In early August 1998, armed forces chief Wiranto visited Aceh to announce a withdrawal of combat forces and an end to the DOM, and to apologize for the army's human rights abuses. In March 1999, President Habibie visited Aceh himself and pledged to aid the region's economy, to help children orphaned by the conflict, and to establish a commission to examine human rights abuses by the security forces (Robinson 1998).

The government also adopted new legislation to address Acehese grievances. In late April 1999, the parliament adopted a pair of decentralization laws (Nos. 22 and 25 of 1999) that gave all of Indonesia's regional and local governments extensive powers, and enabled them to retain much of the income from the extraction of natural resources in their own regions—including 15 percent of the net public income from oil, 30 percent from natural gas, and 80 percent from timber (which is also abundant in Aceh). The parliament adopted a third law (No. 44 of 1999) that affirmed Aceh's right to control its own cultural, religious, and educational affairs.

These developments should have made Aceh's status as a member of the Indonesian republic *more* attractive and independence *less* attractive for Aceh's citizens and politicians. They should have thereby reduced the likelihood that a new civil war would break out. The fact that they failed points to another critical development: a deterioration in the credibility of the government's commitments toward Aceh.

If the government's pledges in 1998 and 1999 were credible, the notion of independence, a risky option that appeared to have little popular support before the late 1980s,¹⁹ should have been unappealing to most Acehese. But if these commitments were not credible, then the only way that the Acehese people could be certain they would no longer suffer from the Indonesian military's brutality, and would retain control of the province's resource wealth, was to secede from the rest of the country.

The central government's poor credibility in Aceh could be traced back to several events: the founding of the republic, when the government refused to make Aceh a separate province, despite Aceh's history as an independent state; actions in 1968 when the Suharto government effectively abrogated the 1963 agreement that granted Aceh special autonomy; and the failure of the Suharto government to fulfill the promises it made to Aceh during the 1987 election campaign.

However low it was initially, the government's credibility seemed to fall even further beginning in 1998 because of a series of events: the revelations about the government's human rights abuses in Aceh, which followed years of denials; President Habibie's failure to keep his pledge to bring human rights violators to justice; President Wahid's failure to fulfill his promises to support the Aceh referendum, prosecute human rights violators at all ranks, and withdraw nonlocal troops from the province; armed forces chief Wiranto's reversal of his August 1998 promise to withdraw combat forces from Aceh; and the government's failure to stop the military's attacks on civilians. The most notably of these were the May 1999 massacre of some 40 peaceful demonstrators near Lhokseumawe, and the July 1999 massacre of between 57 and 70 people at an Islamic boarding school in Beutong Ateuh.

In March 2000, historian Anthony Reid wrote that "During the past year, the overwhelming evidence of military atrocities has rapidly eroded" the belief in national unity formerly held by many Acehese (Reid 2000). Political scientist Harold Crouch concluded in June 2001:

The credibility of the central government in Aceh is close to zero, amongst all sections of the population. Given a history of promises made and broken since the 1950s, even the minority of Acehese who see autonomy as the best solution have little trust in Jakarta's good faith. (ICG 2001b)

The Acehese people, hence, had little reason to believe that the government's offer of regional autonomy, and freedom from further atrocities, would be kept. The central government's reliance on natural gas revenues from Aceh, which in 1998 were worth \$1.2 billion, and provided the government with 9 percent of its total government revenues, may have made these promises even less credible because it convinced the Acehese that the government would not be financially able to fulfill its promise to allow the province to retain more of its resource revenues.²⁰ The belief that Jakarta would not give Aceh true autonomy—and that its promises could not be trusted—helped make independence seem like the most practical solution.

Finally, the proximity of the 1989–91 civil war made a renewal of conflict more likely, as grievances toward the military grew. Soon after Suharto was removed from office, Aceh's newly freed media publicized reports of summary executions, torture, rape, and theft committed by the military over the previous decade. When combat troops started to pull out of Lhokseumawe in August 1998, crowds stoned departing trucks and attacked the provincial office of the ruling Golkar party. In Guempang Minyek, villagers destroyed a Special Forces interrogation center where suspects were allegedly tortured. According to a foreign journalist, "In Aceh, loathing of the military's brutal legacy extends from the humblest villager to the highest provincial official" (McBeth 1998).

The propinquity of the 1990–98 conflict also had a second, more concrete effect: It provided GAM with a pool of willing recruits, aspiring to take vengeance on the military.

The Rise of GAM III

Between 1991 and 1998, there were few signs of GAM activity in Aceh and many locals came to believe that GAM no longer existed. After the government lifted the DOM in August 1998, there were reports of pro-independence neighborhood rallies, and displays of GAM banners and flags. Several Acehese who had worked for the Indonesian Special Forces were killed or disappeared, although it was unclear who was behind these events. A journalist who visited Aceh in mid-November 1998 found no trace of GAM (McBeth 1998).

Yet in early 1999, GAM reappeared and began to grow more quickly than it ever had before. By July 1999, it reportedly had more than 800 men under arms, equipped with assault rifles and grenade launchers. By mid-2001, GAM had 2,000–3,000 regular fighters, and an additional 13,000–24,000 militia members; it was reportedly in control of 80 percent of Aceh's villages (ICG 2001a).

The sudden return of GAM cannot be explained by a change in funding. GAM appeared to have collected little revenue between 1991 and 1999, and it had lost Libya's sponsorship. The main causes for GAM's successful re-emergence may be the jump in popular support for Acehese independence, resulting from the economic crisis that made independence and the retention of LNG revenues seem more attractive; the revelations of human rights abuses; and the government's low credibility. This shift in public opinion made it easier for GAM to recruit new members and, perhaps, to raise funds.²¹

At first GAM used force to conscript new members.²² Over time, however, it began successfully to recruit the children of people who had been killed or tortured by security forces under the DOM, offering them the opportunity to avenge their parents. According to the Care Human Rights Forum, 16,375 children had been orphaned during the 1990–98 military crackdown (McBeth 1998). By mid-2000, these “children of the DOM victims” (*anak korban DOM*) constituted a significant corps of GAM fighters.²³ The *Jakarta Post* reported on July 30, 2000, that most of GAM’s new recruits were children of the DOM victims.²⁴

To fund itself, GAM used a combination of voluntary donations, taxes, extortion, kidnapping, and the sale of timber and cannabis. According to Indonesian intelligence sources interviewed by Schulze (2004), by 2003 GAM was collecting about 1.1 billion rupiah (approximately \$130,000) a month through an extensive tax system levied on personal and business income and schools across the province; funds were also collected from Acehnese living in Malaysia, Thailand, and other parts of Sumatra, often under the threat of violence (Djalal 2000; ICG 2001a; Schulze 2003). These funding schemes were employed *after* GAM’s reappearance. There are no indications that GAM has received assistance from Libya, or any other foreign government, since the late 1980s.

Members of GAM have also tried to raise money from the Lhokseumawe natural gas facility, through both direct and indirect forms of extortion. Between 1999 and March 2001, ExxonMobil reported a growing tally of violence and threats. Its company vans and pickups had been hijacked about 50 times; company airplanes were twice hit by ground fire when they tried to land; facilities were repeatedly attacked with gunfire and grenades; company buses were bombed, or stopped and burned, as they brought employees to work; four employees were killed while off-duty; and other employees were threatened (*Tempo* 2001a). From March to July 2001, the company was forced to shut down the LNG facility because of a lack of security.

Some of these security incidents may have been carried out by the army or by ordinary criminals. At least one, the kidnapping of eight employees, who were briefly held for ransom in May 2000, appeared to have been a freelance operation carried out by GAM members without the leadership’s authorization. However, many of these incidents were part of efforts by GAM to extort money from ExxonMobil, to reduce the government’s gas revenues, or both. By ransoming off a senior executive in early 2001, GAM allegedly raised about 5 billion rupiah (around \$500,000) (Schulze 2004; *Tempo* 2001a). In March 2001, the GAM regional commander in the Lhokseumawe area, Muzakir Mualim, explained, “We expect them [ExxonMobil] to pay income tax to Aceh. We’re only talking about a few percent of the enormous profit they have made from drilling under the earth of Aceh” (*Tempo* 2001a).²⁵ Previously, GAM had pledged that it would not attack foreign companies; the LNG facility attacks may represent a change in policy, or a split between the central GAM leadership and the regional GAM command.

As in 1977–79 and 1989–91, GAM has been hindered by a shortage of weapons. Although in 2001–2002 it had between 15,000 and 27,000 regular and irregular

soldiers, they were thought to have only 1,000–2,500 modern firearms, one or two 60-mm mortars, a handful of grenade launchers, and some land mines. Most GAM fighters were armed with homemade or obsolete firearms, sharp or blunt instruments, or explosives (Davis 2001; ICG 2001a). Many of GAM’s modern arms came from the Indonesian military, often purchased from corrupt officers (*Indonesian Observer* 2001; Lubis et al. 2000). GAM also purchased arms from Thailand and Cambodia, although the Indonesian navy has made it increasingly difficult for GAM to bring in weapons by boat (Davis 2001).

GAM’s organization inside Aceh appears somewhat decentralized. GAM’s military commanders—Abdullah Syafi’ie until his death in January 2002, and Mazukkir Manaf thereafter—have been appointed by the GAM leadership in Sweden and apparently remained loyal to it. There are frequent reports, however, that discipline inside GAM’s armed forces is poor, and that its military structure is highly decentralized. The disjuncture between GAM’s official policy of not attacking foreign companies and the many attacks on the LNG facility may imply that GAM units in the Lhokseumawe area are not fully under GAM’s central control. Indeed, the GAM unit in this area has a reputation for being unusually violent, corrupt, and resistant to central control.²⁶

GAM forces are divided into small groups of 10–20 men, who are at least formally under one of 17 local commanders. Even though GAM activity has been concentrated in the three districts where the movement has traditionally been the strongest—Pidie, East Aceh, and North Aceh—by 2000 GAM had a presence in every part of the province except Sabang, an island in the far north.²⁷

Because of GAM’s funding constraints, dearth of weapons, and limited manpower, it may never be able to defeat the Indonesian army and police on the battleground. Instead, it has developed a series of political tactics to build popular support and draw attention to the Acehnese cause. Since 1999, at least five strategies have been discernible.

The first has been a propaganda campaign that extols Aceh’s glorious history, and denounces the “theft” of its mineral wealth by the Javanese. Speakers and pamphlets commonly suggest that if independent, Aceh would be as wealthy as Brunei, the oil-rich Islamic sultanate on nearby Borneo. This is an economic appeal, not a political one: Brunei is much wealthier, but less democratic than Indonesia. It is also misleading. If Aceh had been fiscally independent in 1998, its per capita GDP would have been \$1,257; this would be about one-third higher than Indonesia’s average GDP, but not close to Brunei’s 1998 per capita income of \$17,600.

The second strategy has been to mobilize public opinion against the Indonesian government by denouncing, and possibly provoking, military repression. Until the early 1990s, the central GAM messages were economic and historical. Since 1991, GAM has also focused on the military’s human rights violations (Robinson 1998). In an interview with a British journalist, Ilias Pase, a GAM commander, suggested that GAM has at times provoked military reprisals in order to boost its support:

We know from experience how the security apparatus will respond [to our activities]. They will kill civilians and burn their homes. This makes the

people more loyal to the GAM. And the people in Jakarta and outside can see that we are serious about our struggle. This is part of the guerrilla strategy. (Dillon 2001)

The Indonesian military is, unfortunately, all too eager to respond to provocations with brutality and, hence, fall into the trap set by GAM.²⁸

The third strategy has been to disable the local government, and where possible, to replace it with GAM's own institutions. Hundreds of schools have been burned down and scores of teachers killed. Many local politicians and civil servants have also been killed, or recruited into GAM's parallel government structure (Schulze 2004). By 2001, as much as 80 percent of Aceh's villages were under GAM's control, and across most of the province, the Indonesian government had ceased to function.

The fourth strategy has been to drive Javanese settlers out of Aceh. In mid-1999, GAM forced at least 15,000 Javanese, some who had lived in Aceh since the 1970s, out of their homes (McBeth et al. 1999). This may reflect, in part, GAM's anti-Javanese ideology, the association of the Javanese with the military (who are loathed), and competition between the Acehnese and non-Acehnese over jobs. It also may have been caused by the fear that the army would organize non-Acehnese settlers into a militia to fight the separatists, as they did in East Timor. Indeed, by 2002 there were widespread reports that Javanese militias had formed, although it was unclear if they had been instigated by the military (ICG 2002; *Tempo* 2001b).

The final strategy has been to bring greater pressure on the Indonesian government by attracting international attention and sympathy. One tactic has been to cultivate the support of international human rights groups. Another approach, employed in mid-1999, was to empty dozens of villages, and move between 80,000 and 100,000 Acehnese into 61 refugee camps, provoking a refugee crisis (Cohen 1999). After drawing international media attention, villagers were allowed to return to their villages and these camps were largely closed down. A third tactic has been to use the promise of peace talks to draw in international actors as mediators and observers (Schulze 2004).

The army and police have responded to GAM with their own mix of strategies. These include attacking and killing GAM personnel, including its military leaders; detaining and torturing anyone believed to have information about GAM, or to be sympathetic to them; burning houses and buildings in villages where GAM may have a presence, or that are simply near recent GAM activities; and forcibly recruiting petty criminals and teenagers as informants. In 2001–02, the military and police had approximately 30,000 personnel in Aceh; by mid-2003, the number had grown to 50,000. They function in what the International Crisis Group calls “a virtual legal vacuum” and have committed a large number of atrocities (Human Rights Watch 2001; ICG 2001a).

The military's failure to contain the rebel movement could be attributed to ineptitude, corruption, and the profits generated by an ongoing conflict. Up and down the chain of command, soldiers profit from the war, and the war has given a political boost to the military as an institution (ICG 2001a). Efforts by both presidents

Habibie and Wahid to find peaceful solutions were subverted, perhaps deliberately, by the military.

The government and GAM have maintained a dialogue throughout much of the conflict, assisted by the Henry Dunant Centre, a private Swiss organization. Yet neither side seems willing to compromise on the core issue of Acehnese independence: GAM insists on it, and Jakarta rejects it. Still, the parties have twice agreed to cease-fires. In May 2000, they agreed to a “humanitarian pause,” but this had little influence on the intensity of the conflict or the casualty rate, and was abandoned in 2001. In December 2002, they adopted a “Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement,” which was hailed as the first step toward a settlement. Although it led to a sharp fall in the casualty rate, it was abandoned in May 2003 after being undermined by both GAM and the Indonesian military (Aspinall and Crouch 2003).

In retrospect, GAM may have agreed to the negotiations, and the cease-fires, for tactical reasons. Bargaining directly with the Indonesian government on foreign soil (Geneva) helped GAM attain a measure of international legitimacy as the representative of the Acehnese people. The December 2002 Framework Agreement also gave GAM a much-needed break from the fighting, allowing it to recruit new members and re-arm (Aspinall and Crouch 2003).

The government's strategy has been to combine military pressure on GAM with a political campaign to reduce GAM's popularity by granting Aceh greater autonomy from Jakarta. In August 2001, President Megawati signed a “Special Autonomy” law (Law No. 18 of 2001) that gave Aceh control of 70 percent of its oil and gas revenues for eight years, after which the arrangement would be subject to review. It would also partially implement Islamic law in Aceh, establish Islamic courts, introduce direct elections for the province's governor, and give the governor greater control over the Acehnese police. Yet by mid-2003, the Acehnese provincial assembly had made little progress in adopting the regulations needed to implement the new law, and in any case, the government's control of Aceh was too tenuous to implement the autonomy law's provisions. Moreover, as Aspinall and Crouch (2003) observe, the government has further hurt the credibility of the autonomy plan by placing heavy military pressure on the province, and by failing to prosecute the military's human rights abuses.

From 1998 to the beginning of 2003, the conflict killed over 4,300 people. Most of the victims were civilians (Human Rights Watch 2003; ICG 2001a).

Conclusion

In general, the conflict in Aceh, Indonesia, fits the CH model of civil wars well. Aceh has many of the characteristics that Collier and Hoeffler identify as risk factors: It is relatively poor, is mountainous, lacks ethnic fragmentation, has a diaspora, suffered from conflict previously, and is highly dependent on the export of natural resources.

When GAM re-emerged in 1999, Indonesia was also only partly democratic; other scholars have suggested that partial democratization tends to raise the danger of conflict (DeNardo 1985; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2001). This chapter

closely fits these arguments. Indonesia's move toward democracy in 1998–99 opened new political space for dissent, and allowed a free press to flourish. But the country's democratic institutions were still too weak to guide Acehese dissent into non-violent channels. Elected officials had only partial control of the military, and the instability of the policy-making process made the government's promises of autonomy less credible.

Four additional factors can help provide a more complete explanation for the Aceh civil war. The first is the entrepreneurship of Hasan di Tiro, the founder of the separatist group GAM. The Aceh conflict was largely caused by the rise of GAM. It is the only organization in Aceh that has violently challenged the Indonesian state since 1963, and had it not formed, Aceh's recent history would be far different. The foundation and growth of GAM was largely the result of di Tiro's tireless efforts.

The second factor has been Acehese grievances. If we look solely at the funding of GAM, we can partly explain why GAM failed to start a civil war in 1976–79 (due to lack of funds) and why it succeeded in 1989–91 (due to Libyan assistance); but we cannot explain why GAM re-emerged in 1999 and grew so quickly, when it had no apparent source of start-up funds. Alternatively, GAM's "failure" in 1976–79 and "success" in 1989–91 and since 1999 can be partly explained by fluctuations in Acehese grievances, which were low in 1976 (when the LNG plant opened), higher in 1989 (when resentments had accrued against the LNG facility and migrants), and very high in 1999 (against the LNG facility, migrants, the economic crisis, and military repression). The rise in grievances lowered the costs of recruitment for GAM, and made it easier for GAM to gain local support and financing.

The third factor was the demonstration effect of the independence referendum allowed in East Timor. Almost immediately after the East Timor referendum was announced, a large and influential pro-referendum movement formed in Aceh. The demonstration effect was not confined to Aceh; it also boosted a virtually dormant independence movement in West Papua.

The fourth additional factor has been the credibility of the central government, which has undermined its efforts to reach a settlement. Government credibility appeared to fall sharply from 1987 to 2003; as a result, its offer of "special autonomy" for Aceh was widely scorned in the province, even though it appeared to satisfy local demands for greater resource revenues and better protection against human rights abuses. Although GAM has been unwilling to compromise on its demand for independence, a credible autonomy offer could have weakened GAM's popular support and made recruitment and fund raising more costly.

Finally, this chapter suggests that Aceh's natural gas facility has played a critical role in the conflict, albeit not through the mechanism that the CH model predicts. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) suggest primary commodities increase the likelihood of civil war by enabling nascent rebel groups to fund their "start-up" costs by looting and selling these commodities.

If Collier and Hoeffler are correct, we should have observed GAM raising money from resource predation before the civil war began—anytime before 1990, or between 1992 and 1998. While GAM attempted to extort money during these peri-

ods from Aceh's commodity sector (including the LNG complex and the agricultural sector), there is little evidence that they succeeded. Only after the civil war was under way (in 1990–91 and 1999–2002) did their extortion efforts pay off. I conclude that the looting of resources did not contribute to the *onset* of civil war in Aceh, though it may have contributed to the *duration* once it began.

There are three alternative ways, however, that Aceh's natural resource wealth appeared to influence the conflict. The first was by creating grievances over the distribution of resource revenues and jobs. The claim that non-Acehese are stealing Aceh's resource wealth has been a central part of GAM's rhetoric since its birth in 1976, just months before the LNG natural gas plant began operations. This belief is now widespread among the Acehese, and has given them a financial incentive to support independence, which they might see as a rational investment in their future. Although the economic attraction of independence may have meant little while the economy was growing quickly in 1976–79 and 1989–91, it heightened the conflict risk after the economic crisis of 1997–98.

Second, Aceh's natural gas wealth increased the risk of conflict by producing a larger military presence in the province and by inducing a more repressive response from the government to early signs of unrest. The government has placed its Military Operations Command (*Kolakops*) for Aceh directly in Lhokseumawe, home of the LNG facility. Lhokseumawe is also the base for one of Aceh's two Sub-Regional Military Commands, Korem 011 (*Komando Resor Militer*) (Robinson 1998).

The military has long had a central role in managing the LNG facility, in part out of fear that grievances over the distribution of its revenues would lead to security disturbances. According to Emmerson, the military had a major role in the LNG facility beginning in the 1970s, because the government believed that,

once those facilities have begun to fill central coffers with foreign exchange, the claims of regionalists to the income from "their" resources must be prevented from undermining the unity of the nation—or, from a regionalist perspective, the hegemony of the center. (Emmerson 1983, 1233)

Officers assigned to protect the Lhokseumawe facility have periodically been involved in the abduction, torture, and execution of Acehese in neighboring areas, whom they suspect are sympathetic to or associated with GAM (*Business Week* 1998; Solomon 2000; *Tempo* 2001a). The district of North Aceh (where the LNG complex is located) has suffered more violence than any of Aceh's 13 districts. Even *before* the complex was targeted by GAM for shakedowns in early 2001, North Aceh had the greatest number of people killed and injured, the largest number of offices burned, and the largest number of schools burned of any district in Aceh. The number of homes and businesses destroyed in North Aceh was more than double the number in East Aceh, which was the next most damaged district (BPS Aceh 2000). In 2002 GAM had far more men, and far more weapons, in North Aceh than in any other district (Schulze 2004).

Finally, Aceh's resource wealth may be making the civil war harder to resolve, by reducing the credibility of the government's commitments to regional autonomy. Even though the government adopted a "special autonomy" law for Aceh in August 2001, the measure was greeted in Aceh with widespread skepticism. The credibility of the government's promises was exceptionally low in Aceh, due in part to the military's human rights abuses, and the failure of national politicians to keep their promises. It may have been lowered even further because Aceh's resource wealth caused its people to doubt that the cash-strapped central government would adhere to the plan for fiscal autonomy once the war was over.

Notes

I am indebted to Ed Aspinall, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Nicholas Sambanis, and Kirsten Schulze for their helpful suggestions on this chapter.

1. For clarity I always refer to the organization as GAM, even though it now formally calls itself the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front, and refers to its army as AGAM (*Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*).
2. Civil wars are generally defined as conflicts between a government and a rebel group that generate at least 1,000 combat-related deaths. On the definition of civil war, see Sambanis (2001).
3. For example, the German invasion of Poland in 1938—a country that was, like East Timor, temporarily annexed by its conqueror—could hardly be classified as German civil war.
4. I develop and illustrate the claim that natural resources can influence civil wars in different ways in Ross (2002, 2003).
5. The resource export-to-GDP figures, and all other economic data, are derived from data in World Bank (2001) unless otherwise specified.
6. While ethnic dominance matters at the national level by creating grievances among minority groups, it is hard to see how it would increase the risk of civil war *within* a restive province, when the province itself is largely populated by an ethnic minority. Hence, I do not consider it here as a risk factor.
7. Economic figures for Aceh must be treated with care, because the boom in natural gas production—which began in 1977—produced quickly rising figures for the province's GDP, even though the vast majority of this revenue accrued to the central government and was spent in other provinces. For this reason, I prefer to use figures that subtract out the value of oil and gas production.
8. The Aceh rebellion declared itself part of the Darul Islam rebellion, which began in West Java in 1947, so it is sometimes referred to as the Darul Islam rebellion; I refer to it here as the Daud Beureueh rebellion to distinguish it from the Javanese movement.
9. GAM often prefers "Acheh" to the more common "Aceh," and appears to use the term "Acheh-Sumatra" to indicate that it seeks independence for all of the island of Sumatra, much or all of which it believes should come under Acehnese rule. See di Tiro (1984, entry for August 20, 1977) and Aspinall (2002).
10. According to Sjamsuddin (1984, 128), the central government believed that if GAM won Daud Beureueh's backing, GAM would also receive broad support from the

Acehnese people—and "transform the movement into a holy war that would be very difficult to quell."

11. The gas field proved to be about 50 percent larger than initially estimated, holding perhaps 20–21 trillion cubic feet of gas.
12. Interview with anonymous former Mobil employee, May 3, 2000.
13. GAM initially railed against Mobil Oil and foreign exploitation of Aceh's resources; by the late 1990s, GAM had dropped its stance against Mobil, but insisted they should pay taxes to GAM, not the Indonesian government.
14. Data on Aceh's GDP is from internal World Bank documents.
15. According to Kell (1995), between 10 and 20 GAM members survived the 1980s in Aceh, hiding out in the forests and producing cannabis to support themselves.
16. These early attacks may not have been carried out by GAM, but by defecting security officers who were fighting the antinarcotics initiative. GAM was only identified as an active party in June 1990. This adds credibility to Geoffrey Robinson's hypothesis that GAM capitalized on the defection of corrupt security officers, perhaps taking advantage of the opportunity to launch a new offensive (Robinson 1998).
17. On the meaning of the term "DOM," see Widjajanto and Kammen (1999).
18. Two key weaknesses were the inability of elected officials to control the military and the instability of the policy-making process, which made the government's commitments less credible.
19. On this point, see Hiorth (1986), Liddle (1986), and Robinson (1998).
20. This argument is drawn from Fearon (2001), who suggests that separatist conflicts are difficult to resolve, in part, because government promises of regional autonomy typically lack credibility. He also notes that when a region has lots of resource wealth—like Aceh—a government's promises of fiscal autonomy will be even less credible, since locals will anticipate that the central government's desire for resource revenues will eventually cause it to rescind its pledges of local autonomy.
21. It is also possible, however, that the end of authoritarian rule allowed Acehnese to express their previously guarded support for independence. I thank Ed Aspinall for emphasizing this point.
22. Author interview, Medan, June 2000.
23. *Ibid.*
24. It is possible that GAM's re-emergence was facilitated by the Indonesian military, although the evidence is sketchy. Several observers note that in late 1998 and early 1999 the military did little to stop GAM's reappearance, and that the military stood to gain both politically and financially from renewed conflict. Alternatively, GAM may have simply taken advantage of the military's temporary weakness to organize itself.
25. Some of GAM's attacks on the LNG facility have other motives. GAM has periodically attacked military units that happen to be based at the plant. In October 2000, 17,000 sticks of dynamite were stolen from one of the plant's warehouses, although GAM may not have been the perpetrator. There may also be an ideological component to some of GAM's activities around the LNG complex: GAM officials continue to denounce ExxonMobil for "exploiting Aceh's land for the benefit of the colonialist government in Jakarta" (*Jakarta Post* 2001).

26. Author interview, Jakarta, June 2000.
27. Author interview, Banda Aceh, June 2000.
28. This is a time-honored method for generating support for social movements; scholars of social movements sometimes call it "countermobilization."

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The Lebanese Civil War, 1975–90

3

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The Lebanese civil war broke out in April 1975, 29 years after the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon in 1946. The civil war was finally settled in October 1989, under an accord of national reconciliation negotiated by the Lebanese Parliament under Arab auspices in the town of Taif, Saudi Arabia. This agreement, known as the Taif Accord, was ratified the same month by the Lebanese Parliament. Actual fighting did not completely end, however, until a year later, in October 1990.

This chapter analyzes the Lebanese civil war using the Collier-Hoeffler (CH) model. After explaining the prewar conditions, we discuss the identities, interests, and organization of the multiple parties to the war and identify three phases of the war. We then evaluate the fit of the CH model to this case and consider alternative explanations.

We find that religious, rather than ethnic, fractionalization was a key factor in the Lebanese civil war. External intervention was also crucial. Because economic explanations of the causes of the Lebanese war are weak, the CH model, which gives great weight to economic factors, does a poor job in predicting the outbreak of the war. Factors identified by CH as potentially affecting civil war duration are, however, helpful in explaining the relatively long duration of Lebanon's civil war. Finally, we briefly examine the goals and actual results of the Taif Accord. We offer an assessment of the likely stability of this "sectarian" resolution to the conflict, taking into account that, until very recently, there was a continued Syrian military presence and strong political influence in the country. Under strong international pressure, Syrian troops were forced to withdraw from Lebanon in April 2005, and consequently Syrian influence greatly diminished.

Prewar Conditions

Rapid Economic Growth

The prewar Lebanese economy grew rapidly during the years 1946–75. The private sector, which was primarily trade- and services-oriented, with no significant